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BRICK BY BRICK: DECONSTRUCTING PYRAMIDLIKE COMPANIES BY REQUIRING DISCLOSURES
FROM MULTILEVEL MARKETING SCHEMES
ALEX CHUMBLEY*
ABSTRACT

Multilevel marketing companies ("MLMs") have thrived in
the internet era as participants are able to market their products
to their friends and followers on social media sites. Further, periods
of high unemployment, such as during the COVID-19 pandemic,
have led to increased enrollment in these companies. However, very
few people actually make any money from selling for these companies. Beyond that, almost half of those who participate lose money
due to the enrollment costs. This Note examines past case law surrounding MLMs and critiques the current regulations in place that
fail to ensure that new participants are making a fully informed
decision when they sign up to work for these companies. Ultimately,
this Note proposes new disclosure requirements on MLMs that will
better protect consumers and make sure that these business structures do not harm financially at-risk populations.
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INTRODUCTION

On April 24, 2020, the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC")
sent warning letters to ten multilevel marketing companies
(''MLMs") demanding that they stop advertising that their products could treat or prevent the spread of COVID-19.1 There are,
of course, no scientific studies showing any connection between
these products and the treatment or prevention of COVID-19.2 The
warning also demanded that companies' distributors stop promising riches to potential investors that are affected financially by
the pandemic. a
However, as the pandemic forced companies to furlough and
lay off their employees, the pool of potential new distributors exponentially grew. 4 As that pool grew, MLM distributors became
more aggressive in recruiting new members. 5 The Direct Selling
Association (''DSA') is a group that advocates on behalf of MLMs. 6
'See Seena Gressin, FTC Sends COVID-Related Warnings to MLM Companies, FED. TRADE COMM'N CONSUMER INFO. (Apr. 24, 2020), https:/lwww.con
sumer.ftc.gov/blog/2020/04/ftc-sends-covid-related-warnings-mlm-companies
[https://perma.cc/H38E-QB3E]. MLMs have a history of making dubious health
claims. See, e.g., Heidi Evans, Safety, Methods Questioned: Herbalife: Weighty
Profits and Government Probes, L.A. TIMES (Apr. 4, 1985), https://www.latimes
.com/archives/la-xpm-1985-04-04-mn-19575-story.html [https://perma.cc/MJL6
-3XFS] (The 1982 Herbalife Career Book claimed that their special products
could ''help relieve a host of problems, including venereal disease, arteriosclerosis, tumors, bad breath, and bed wetting."); Michelle Celarier, Herbalife Still
Making False Claims: Ackman Video, N.Y. POST (Dec. 11, 2014), https://ny
post.com/2014112/11/herbalife-still-making-false-claims-ackman-video/ [https:/1
perma.cc/5SDM-SK9S] ("[Herbalife sales people] pitch[ ] Herbalife products
as a panacea for everything from asthma attacks and arthritis to high blood
pressure and diabetes.").
• See Gressin, supra note 1.
8 See id. A quoted social media message even encouraged readers to invest
their COVID-19 related stimulus check into joining an MLM. ld. ("[E]veryone's getting stimulus checks right now .... There is no better investment you
could do .... Take that money that you're about to get back ... figure out a way
to make this happen tonight.").
4 See Abby Vesoulis & Eliana Dockterman, Pandemic Schemes: How Multilevel Marketing Distributors Are Using the Internet---1lnd the Coronavirusto Grow Their Businesses, TIME (July 9, 2020), https://time.com/5864 712/mul
tilevel-marketing-schemes-coronavirus/ [https://perma.cc/HJ98-XCSV].
• See id.
• See id.
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A DSA survey showed that a majority of MLM companies found
the COVID-19 pandemic had a "positive'' impact on their revenue.7
This impact is not unique to the economic impacts of COVID19; recessions have a history of benefiting MLM enrollment. 8
Another DSA report showed that the Great Recession led to nearly
a twenty percent growth for these companies in the late 2000s
and early 2010s. 9 This growth was not tied to dubious claims about
health benefits.lO These companies sell anything from health products, to clothing products, workout programs, and cookware.ll Instead, these companies tend to grow most when unemployment
rates rise and people begin looking for ways to make ends meet.l2
MLMs can attract vulnerable people, such as individuals who either
are experiencing income insecurity or are generally unhappy with
where they are in life.13
Multilevel marketing companies skirt general rules for
franchised businesses, and as a result, their pyramid-like business
models go largely unchecked. 14 These companies misrepresent
themselves as "income" or ''business" opportunities to down-ontheir-luck people, but in over ninety-nine percent of cases, the
participants lose money.l 5 A 2018 survey showed that MLM participants make less than seventy cents an hour.l 6 Yet, this predatory
7 See id.
• See id.
• See id.
10 See id.
uSee id.
12 See Emma Penrod, As the COVID-19 Ecorwmic Crisis Deepens, Financially
Risky MLMs are Moving in to Fill the Employment Void, INSIDER (July 14, 2020),
https://www .insider.com/unemployed-people-turn- to- risky-multi-level-market
ing-companies-2020-7 [https://perma.cc/99YF-W56K].
'"See id.
14 See Jon M. Taylor, The Case (for and) Against Multi-Level Marketing,
CONSUMER AWARENESS INST., at ch. 7 p.1 (2011), https://www.ftc.gov/sites/de
fault/files/documentslpublic_comments/trade-regulation-rule-disclosure-require
ments-and-prohibitions-concerning-business-opportunities-ftc.r511993-00008
%C2%A0/00008-57281. pdf [https:l/perma.cc/7CSS-MESQ]. ''Pyramid-like" refers
to a business structure where "the vast majority of commissions ... go to a tiny
percentage of' individuals at the highest ranks of the company, with most of
the lowest ranked individuals losing money. Id.
10 See id.
1s Brittney Laryea, Survey: Vast Majority of Multilevel Marketing Participants Earn Less Than 70 Cents an Hour, MAGNIFY MONEY (Sept. 17, 2018),
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behavior still leads to tens of billions of dollars in sales each year
within the U.8.17 Moreover, the profits reaped from these sales
reach only a minuscule percentage of the MLM's salespeople, with
company executives taking much more than their fair share. 18
These executives are able to live lavish lifestyles from these profits
and often take on celebrity-like status to their employees who often do all they can to attend company conventions in order to
meet these executives.19
Today, multilevel marketing companies have found a way
to toe the line of legality in order to avoid intervention by the
Fl'C. 20 Often, participants recruit individuals to join the company
by presenting it as a promising financial opportunity. 21 They misrepresent participants' expected income from sales by only advertising the average revenue of their top performers22 and proceed
to coerce participants into spending exorbitant amounts of their
own money to reach certain levels within the company, which gives
them access to better job titles and product promotions.23 Additionally, they make buy-back provisions overly complicated, and
qualification under those provisions is nearly impossible.24
https://www.magnjfymoney.com/blog/news/survey-vast-majority-multilevel-mar
keting-participants-earn-less-70-cents-hour/ [https://perma.cc/C4G5-mYN].
17 See Melanie Hicken, The Money Behind Herbalife, Mary Kay and others,
CNN MONEY (Jan. 10, 2013), https://money.cnn.com/2013/01/09/pf/multilevel
-marketing-industry/index.html [https://perma.cc/G9DF-BDR6].
1a See id.
19 See What You Should Know About Market America, TRUTHINADVERTIS
ING.ORG (Nov. 2, 2020), https://www.truthinadvertising.org/what-you-should
-know-about-market-america/ [https://perma.cc/P9N6-9KU4].
20 See Casey Bond, How MLMs and Cults Use the Same Mind Control
Techniques, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 13, 2019), https://www.huffpost.com/en
try/multilevel-marketing-companies-mlms-cults-similarities_l_5d49f8c2e4b09e
72973df3d3 [https://perma.cc/BP6U-CU42].
21 See id.
22 See Robert Fitzpatrick, Deceptive Income Disclosures Power MIM Recruiting and Expansion, NASDAQ (Mar. 30, 2016), https://www.nasdaq.com/arti
cles/deceptive-income-disclosures-power-mlm-recruiting-and-expansion-2016
-03-30 [https://perma.cc/C27C-EXWH].
23 See Bond, supra note 20.
24 See In re Amway Corp., 93 F.T.C. 618, 646 (1979). Buy-back provisions
are company policies that allow distributors to sell their products back to the
company when they wish to stop distributing. Id.
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These businesses are no strangers to litigation.25 Many
distributors-in addition to the FTC-have brought suits against
these companies, alleging that they are run as pyramid schemes.26
However, these business models are well-connected politically,
and legislative actions regarding these companies often have motivations other than protecting low-level participants in direct sales
companies-ultimately insulating these business models from
legalliability. 27
The FTC must do more to protect entry-level participants
in these businesses. 28 This Note will propose the promulgation of
new regulations on these businesses that will require them to disclose realistic income expectations for new members. 29 These new
disclosures will help ensure that participants can be well-informed
prior to making the financial commitments required to join and
are less likely to later feel trapped in their commitment. so
Part I of this Note will define what pyramid and Ponzi
schemes are, how they function, and how a standard MLM business model compares to them. 31 Part II of this Note will discuss
the litigation history around pyramid schemes and multilevel
marketing companies. 32 It will begin with the landmark Amway
Decision in 1979 and how that decision has impacted subsequent
cases and FTC regulation on MLM business models.aa Part III
will delve into the relationships between direct sales companies
and politicians, such as Ronald Reagan and Donald Trump, which
have contributed to the business model's flourishing.34 Finally,
Part N will propose additional regulations that would better
25 See, e.g., id. at 735; Webster v. Omnitrition Intern, Inc., 79 F.3d 776, 780
(9th Cir. 1996); FTC v. Burnlounge, Inc., 753 F.3d 878, 880 (9th Cir. 2014).
2s See Amway Corp., 93 F.T.C. at 618; Webster v. Omnitrition Intern, Inc.,
79 F.3d at 780; FTC v. Burnlounge, Inc., 753 F.3d at 889.
27 See James R. Sobieraj, Myths About Self-Consumption in MLMs, THE
NAT'L L. REV. (Feb. 22, 2018), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/myths-about
-self-consumption-mlms [https://perma.cc/9ZKY-2WN6].
2a See id.
29 See infra Part III.
ao See infra Part III.
"' See infra Part I.
32 See infra Part II.
33 See infra Part II.
84 See infra Part III.
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protect participants and force these companies to be more transparent with prospective distributors about likely outcomes.35

I. PYRAMID SCHEME, PONZI SCHEME, OR
MULTILEVEL MARKETING SCHEME?

Pyramid schemes and Ponzi schemes are terms that are
frequently thrown around, but few people are truly familiar with
what these business models look like or how they function.36 Still,
many people equate MLMs to these types of business modelsand not without merit. 37

A. Pyramid Schemes and Ponzi Schemes
Pyramid schemes take shape in many different forms, so
defining them must be done in a more abstract manner.3B All pyramid schemes share one common characteristic: They promise
potential consumers profits based primarily on their ability to
recruit others to also join the program. 39 Though some pyramid
schemes may purport to be marketing a tangible product, products
are not near the real focus of these businesses and are instead just
used in a thinly veiled attempt to hide the true business model. 40
These companies incentivize their new recruits to sell more
products by offering them shiny new titles with a higher status
within the company. 41 However, the companies do not require
them to sell these products to consumers outside of the business,
leaving open a simple loop hole for their new recruits to buy more
stock on their own than they could ever actually sell in order to
get the next promotion. 42 These recruits spend their own money
to obtain promotions within the company, leading to profits for
See infra Part IV.
Debra A. Valentine, Former Gen. Couns. Fed. Trade Comm'n, Pyramid
Schemes, Address Before the International Monetary Fund's Seminar on Current Legal Issues Affecting Central Banks (May 13, 1998), https://www.ftc
.gov/public-statements/1998/05/pyramid-schemes [https://perma.cc/G2HL-NH9K].
37 Id.
86

36

/d.
/d.
40Jd.
41/d.
42Jd.
38
39
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those higher up in the scheme. 43 As a result of these internal pur·
chases, schemes of this nature can claim that their products are
selling at an impressive rate. 44 But in reality, most of the products
are not going to consumers outside of the organization, and most
of the purchases are only being made by their own distributors. 45
Ponzi schemes, while similar, are often less complex than
pyramid schemes. 46 With Ponzi schemes, there are usually not
any products being sold, nor are there incentives to recruit new
investors. 47 Instead, the organizer promises quick and high returns to investors, collects their payments, and uses these new
investments to pay off their own previously promised returns to
earlier investors. 48
But the issue with both Ponzi schemes and pyramid schemes
is that, although they are seductive in their promise of high returns, their failure is inevitable as the pool of potential investors
will eventually run dry. 49 Often, those most well-equipped to handle the financial losses from the schemes' failure are the early
investors who make out with the profits. 5° Conversely, those more
desperate for the promised financial boom are left waiting at the
altar after supporting others' profits. 51
A simple illustration of the socioeconomic impact of these
business plans can be seen in the "Airplane" game that became
popular in the late 1980s and early 1990s.52 It starts out with a
person, calling themselves a ''pilot," inviting others over for a party
and offering them to buy into a game to become "co-pilots"-but
in order to participate, they must pay a fee. 53 These co-pilots then
each are in charge of recruiting two more players, who will become
/d.
44/d.
45 /d.
46 /d.
47 Id.
48 /d.
49 /d.
50 See id.
51 See id.
52 See Lawrence Kilman, Newest Illegal Pyramid Scheme Going Up and
Up, But Not Away, AP NEWS (Mar. 23, 1987), https://apnews.com/article/789
4d0352lda555b7ea45e6f'78323tbb [https://perma.cc/3F6B-XRQT].
58 /d.
48
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"flight attendants," for a smaller fee. 54 These flight attendants
will then recruit two more players themselves who will act as ''passengers" for an even lower fee. 55 Once the plane becomes full, there
are fifteen participants in total, with everyone but the pilot having
bought into the game. 56 The pilot is then given all of the money,
and the plane or ''pyramid''-as it looks when viewed hierarchicallysplits in half. 57 The pilot retires, and everyone is promoted. 58 The
co-pilots become pilots, the flight attendants become co-pilots,
the passengers become flight attendants, and the now-flight attendants are in charge of recruiting passengers. 59 The process
then repeats, with all parties buying into their new positions in
the scheme. 60 People are motivated to join because once they
reach the top of the game and become a pilot, they make exponentially more money than they spent to participate. 61 The problem
becomes apparent, however, once the game has run through a few
cycles, social circles exhaust; it becomes more difficult to recruit
additional people. 62 Once an airplane folds, the whole scheme
crashes, and those left onboard lose all of their investment. 63
Often, the airplane game begins in wealthy communities,
where participants are better equipped to take financial risks and
the game is more of just that: a game. 64 It isn't relied upon for the
participants' livelihoods.65 However, with time, the pool of participants slowly and inevitably expands into less well-off areas where
64Jd.
55 /d.
55Jd.
57 ld.
58Jd.
59 /d.
60Jd.
6t See id.
62 ld. On an international scale, if someone starts a pyramid scheme and
recruits five persons, asks those five people to recruit five people, and so on,
mathematically this could only work for thirteen cycles---after which we would
exceed the population of the earth. Herb Greenberg, Multi-Level Marketing
Critic: Beware 'Main Street Bubble,' CNBC (Jan. 9, 2013), https://www.cnbc
.com/2013/01/09/multilevel-marketing-critic·beware·main·street·bubble.html
[https://perma.cc/8LXS-DCMK].
68 Kilman, supra note 52.
64 See id.
65 See id.
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it becomes harder and harder for participants to recruit people
willing or equipped to take the necessary financialleap.66 Once this
happens, the planes' folding creates a drastically adverse impact
on those left onboard. 67

B. Multilevel Marketing Schemes
Multilevel Marketing Schemes are "companies [that] sell
their products or services through person-to-person sales."6B Some
of the more well-known MLMs include Mary Kay, Arbonne International, Rodan & Fields, and It Works Marketing.69 Entrylevel members of MLMs are often referred to as "distributor[s],"
''participant[s]," or "contractor[s]." 70 These participants, in most
companies, make money in two ways: (1) by selling the company's products, or (2) by recruiting new participants and earning
commissions based on their recruit's sales.n Usually included in
a participant's commissions from a recruit's sales are commissions
from any of the their recruit's sales, and their recruit's sales, and
so on.72
Having already discussed the inevitable end to pyramid
schemes due to their emphasis on recruiting, it is easy to recognize
the inherent limitations on the MLM business model. 73 While some
participants may be able to fmd sustainable success in these companies, the most successful people will be the ones who are able
to recruit and earn a commission-not only on their own sales but
ss See id.

See id.
Multi-Level Marketing Businesses and Pyramid Schemes, FED. TRADE
COMM'N (Oct. 2019), https:l/www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0065-multi-level-mar
keting-businesses-and-pyramid-schemes [https://perma.cc/5U26-GSMN].
69 Megan Macdonald and Kate Higgins, Multi-level Marketing Make-Up Brand
Mary Kay Pulls Out of Australia and New Zealand, ABC NEWS (Mar. 6, 2020),
https://www.abc.net.aulnews/2020-03-06/mary-kay-pulls-out-of-australia-and
-new-zealand/12032980 [https://perma.cc/KV7L-QG5H]; FTC Sends Warning
Letters to Multi-Level Marketers Regarding Health and Earnings Claims They or
Their Participants are Making Related to Coronavirus, FED. TRADE COMM'N,
https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2020/04/ftc-sends-warning-let
ters-multi -level-marketers-regarding-health [https://perma.cc/U238-TCU8].
70 Multi-Level Marketing Businesses and Pyramid Schemes, supra note 68.
71Jd.
67

6B

72Jd.
7s

See id.
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also on the sales of their recruits. 74 As with pyramid schemes,
problems will always arise for some participants when the well
of possible participants runs dry and they are stuck relying on
only their own sales as an income. 75 Most people who join these
companies as distributors make little or no money; many people
even lose money. 76
Herbalife Inc., is a publicly traded MLM that is listed on
the New York Stock Exchange. 77 Billionaire Bill Ackman famously
placed a $1 billion bet on Herbalife shares in an attempt to short·
sell the stock, after reading the research of William Keep, Dean of
the School of Business at the College of New Jersey. 78 Many investors have bet against Ackman's gamble.79 Regardless, Ackman's
short-sell attempt is a clear signal that he thinks Herbalife will
crash, like the airplane game that eventually ran out of participants.80 If the company does crash, the low-level participants
will be the ones most affected, just like the passengers and copilots in the airplane game. 81
See id.
See Greenberg, supra note 62.
76 Marguerite DeLiema et al., AARP Study of Multilevel Marketing: Profiling Participants and their Experiences in Direct Sales, AARP 2 (2018), https:/1
www .aarp.org/content/dam/aarp/aarp_foundation/2018/pdf/AARP%20Founda
tion%20MLM%20Research%20Study"/o20Report%2010.8.18.pdf [https://perma.cc
/5AXF·4SE2].
77 Herbalife Nutrition LTD Quote, NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE, https:/1
www.nyse.com/quote!XNYS:HLF [https://perma.cc/LH6M-ZXZY].
78 Svea Herbst·Bayliss & Jennifer Ablan, Herbalife billionaire brawl puts
spotlight on N.J. professor, REUTERS (Aug. 29, 2013), https://www.reuters.com
/articlelherbalife·professor·hedgefundslherbalife·billionaire·brawl-puts-spot
light-on-n·j-professor-idUKL2NOGU27020130830 [https://perma.cc/Z2NN·KNSA].
"Short·selling" is a unique--and notably risky-way of investing where an investor borrows stock, only to sell it later; see David John Marotta, What Is A
Short Sell?, FORBES (Aug. 21, 2020), https://www.forbes.com/sites/davidma
rotta/2020/08/21/what·is-a-short-sell/#1b3350b363e1 [https://perma.cc/2V9G
-HLWT]. The investor hopes that the price decreases after it is borrowed, so
that they are able to sell it and make a profit; if the price of the stock goes up,
the investor must pay the difference, which can amount to a huge loss. Id.
Short·selling is seen as a ''losers game," because investors risk losing a lot of
money. Id. Ultimately, Ackman invested his money with the expectation that
Herbalife's stock will tank, or even that they will go bankrupt. See Herbst·
Bayliss & Ablan, supra note 78.
79 See Herbst-Bayliss & Ablan, supra note 78.
74
76

BD[d.

81

See Kilman, supra note 52.
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II. HISTORY OF THESE ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES
Direct Sales Companies have been a part of United States
commerce for nearly a century. 82 While pyramid schemes have
been technically illegal for quite some time, these organizations
have been able to toe the line of illegality, as can be seen through
the various high-profile lawsuits filed against them.B3 Additionally, a history of these organizations would be incomplete without
detailing their ties to political figures.B4 These strong ties are well
established, starting most notably with President Ronald Reagan,
who spoke at an Amway-sponsored event to a crowd predominantly
composed of Amway distributors. 85 Even President Donald Trump
has a history of promoting MLMs, including the promotion of ACN
in 2011 through his Celebrity Apprentice television show. 86 Undoubtedly, the political influence that these companies wield plays
a strong role in the creation and enforcement of FTC regulations. 87

A. Judicial History
The 1979 Amway decision is the landmark case for multilevel
marketing litigation. 88 In its ruling, the FTC's Administrative Law
Judge ("ALJ'') determined that MLMs were not per se illegal, and
that Amway's business model was set up sufficiently to avoid being
82 See The Business of Direct Selling, PuBLIC BROADCASTING SERVICE, https:l/
www.pbs.org/wgbhlamericanexperience/features/tupperware-direct/ [https:/1
perma.cc/FRG3-TIN2].
83 See, e.g., Lisette Voytko, Herbalife, Younique, LuLaRoe and Other MIMs
Suddenly under Fire, FORBES (Nov. 11, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites
/lisettevoytko/2019111/07/herbalife-younique-lularoe-and-other-mlms-suddenly
-under-f"lre/?sh=639c88f77db6 [https://perma.cc/ADE6-WYP2].
B4 See Matt Stroud, How Lobbying Dollars Prop up Pyramid Schemes, THE
VERGE (Apr. 8, 2014), https://www.theverge.com/2014/4/8/5590550/alleged-pyra
mid-schemes-lobbying-ftc [https://perma.cc/L8R3-HRRQ].
85 See Dale Russakoff & Juan Williams, Rearranging ~mway Event' For
Reagan, WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 1984), https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive
/politics/1984/01/22/rearranging-amway-event-for-reaganlh3e74482-5ce0-4d20
-9f98-ebdc9b4d4918/ [https://perma.cc/FXG2-NYU8].
88 Lisette Voytko, Trump's Biggest Side Hustle Outside of 'Apprentice'? MultiLevel Marketing Schemes, FoRBES (Sept. 29, 2020), https:l/www.forbes.com/sites
/lisettevoytko/2020/09/29/trumps-biggest-side-hustle-outside-of-apprentice-multi
-level-marketing-schemes/#46542cc9lb54 [https://perma.cc/HR7C-84PP].
87 See Stroud, supra note 84.
88 See generally Amway Corp., 93 F.T.C. 618 (1979).
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classified as a pyramid scheme.B9 The FTC noted three of Amway's company policies as being significant in distinguishing the
company from a pyramid scheme: (1) the buy-back rule, which
allowed distributors to sell their unused stock back to the company if they were leaving the role; (2) the seventy percent rule,
which ensured that the majority of the stock distributors bought
were being sold to others and not being kept by the distributor;
and (3) the ten customer rule, which tied company bonuses to distributors' ability to sell products to many different people. 90 illtimately, all of these rules were put in place to "encourage retail
sales and prevent 'inventory loading' by [distributors]."91
Prior to the Amway decision, the FTC classified companies
as illegal pyramid schemes when they involved ''the payment by
participants of money to the company in return for which they
receive (1) the right to sell a product and (2) the right to receive
in return for recruiting other participants into the program rewards which are unrelated to sale of the product to ultimate users."92 This definition was affirmed in a 2018 release by the FTC. 93
Cases following the Amway decision make clear that the FTC was
primarily concerned with instances where recruiting and distributing enrollment drives participants' compensation. 94

1. 1979 Amway Decision
Rich DeVos and Jay Van Andel founded Amway Corporation Inc. ("Amway") in 1959.95 From its founding, Amway worked
to "revolutionize" the direct selling business model.96 Amway's
Id. at 735.
oo Id. at 716.
91 See Webster v. Omnitrition Int'l, Inc., 79 F. 3d 776, 783 (9th Cir. 1996).
Inventory loading occurs when new distributors are required by the company
to purchase the company's products. SeeAmway Corp., 93 F.T.C. at 716.
92 In re Koscot Interplanetary, Inc., 86 F.T.C. 1106, 1975 (1975).
98 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Staff Offers Business Guidance
Concerning Multi-Level Marketing (Jan. 4, 2018), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events
/press-releases/2018/01/ftc-staff-offers-business-guidance-concerning-multi-level
[https://perma.cc/TX3U-B733].
94 See Sobieraj, supra note 27.
96 Our Story, AMwAY GLOBAL [hereinafter Amway's Story], https://amway
global.com/our-story/ [https://perma.cc/66SM-A6SG].
96Jd.
89
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products ranged from nutrition and beauty products to home goods
and energy drinks.97
In 1975, the FI'C filed a five-count complaint against Amway
alleging various violations of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act. 98 Specifically, the complaint included allegations that
the company engaged in resale price maintenance, restricted distributors' supply and reselling outlets, and restricted the distributors' advertising.99 Most notably, the complaint accused Amway of
misrepresenting both the profitability of recruiting others, as well
as the high turnover and substantial business expenses involved
in joining their organization)OO
Ultimately, an ALJ determined that Amway was "not in
business to sell distributorships and is not an illegal pyramid
scheme."lOl The ALJ was ultimately concerned with two overarching issues that Amway worked to avoid: inventory loading and
retailing_102 Amway had three company policies that worked to
address these issues.1oa
First, since its inception, Amway has had a ''buy-back
104
rule." This rule guarantees distributors that either Amway or
another sponsoring distributor will buy any unused, marketable
products back from a distributor whose inventory is not moving
or who wishes to quit the company_105 Essentially, this rule works
as insurance to distributors.l06 If they are unable to meet their
anticipated sales, the company will buy back whatever is left,
minimizing the risk of personal financial loss for the distributors.l07
Second, Amway also had a seventy percent rule, which required "[every] distributor [to] sell at wholesale and/or retail at
least 70 percent of the total amount of products he bought during a
given month in order to receive the Performance Bonus on all
Amway Global, https:/lwww.amway.rom/ [https://perma.cc/7NQP-5FQE].
Amway Corp., 93 F.T.C. 618, 629 (1979).
99 Id. at 630.
1oo Id.
101 Id. at 700.
102 Id.
1oa Id. at 668.
104 Id. at 646.
1oo Id.
100 See id.
101 Id.
97
9B
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products bought."lOS This rule worked to prevent Amway's distributors from purchasing inventory without passing it on to consumers outside of the company.1°9 In other words, this rule prevents
distributors from feeling pressured to buy up company products
for the sole purpose of earning a performance bonus. 110
Third, Amway further avoided issues of inventory loading
and retailing through their ten-customer rule.1 11 This rule stated
that for a distributor to obtain bonuses based on monthly sale
volume, "a sponsoring distributor must make not less than one sale
at retail to each of ten different customers that month."112 This
rule worked to ensure that retail sales to consumers outside of
the organization was an essential aspect of the distributor's role_l13
Other direct sales companies have seen these three rules
as guideposts for avoiding accusations of being pyramid schemes.1 14
However, later case law further complicates the governance of
these rules_115 Today, many MLMs implement similar rules, but
a closer examination of their policies shows that these rules are
often toothless_116
Amway did not leave the case unscathed.1 17 In its Final
Order, the FTC directed Amway to change some of its behavior.1 18
The FTC determined that their recruiting advertisements and
pitches had "the capacity to deceive" potential participants as it
misrepresented realistic income expectations in joining the company_119 Further, the court ordered Amway to cease representing
any earning potentials to prospective distributors in any amount
above the average of its distributors in recent years without
proper disclosures_120
1o8

Id.

at

1os Id. at
110 Id.
111 ld.

Id.

718.
646.

716.
646.
114 See infra Section II.A.2.
115 See infra Section II.A.2.
116 See Sobieraj, supra note 27.
117 See Amway Corp., 93 F.T.C.
118 Id.
119 Id. at 729-30.
120 Id. at 738.
112
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Just a few years after this decision, the FTC issued a
$100,000 fine against Amway for failing to adhere to their guidelines.121 The FTC again charged the company with misrepresenting
average income for distributors, this time in newspaper advertisements used across the United States.122 Further, the advertisement
did not contain "clear and conspicuous disclosures of the average
earning or sales of all distributors in any recent year or the percent of distributors who actually achieved the results claimed."123
Today, Amway is thriving.1 24 According to their website,
Amway is "still disrupting the retail industry by empowering''
their distributors_125 Direct Selling News ranked it as the number
one direct sales company in the world; Amway brings in nearly
8.5 billion dollars in revenue each year_126

2. Subsequent Case History
Following the Amway decision, adjudicators remained critical of MLMs that largely based their income structures on compensation for recruiting regardless of actual sales.127 Corporate
attempts to hide these headhunting fees through smoke-and-mirror
compensation structures were insufficient.12s
Omnitrition International, Inc. is an MLM company that
sells health and skin care products_129 In the 1990s, some of their
distributors brought suit against the company for being an illegal
pyramid scheme, despite the company having modeled their internal
Ruth Marcus, Amway Says it Was Unnamed Donor to Help Broadcast
GOP Convention, WASH. PoST (July 26, 1996), https://www.waslringtonpost.com
/archive/politics/1996/07/26/amway·says-it·was-unnamed-donor·to·help·broad
cast·gop·conventionlfdefcb71·221a·4h55·94fO·ecc6336eb263/ [https://perma.cc
/4EXV-ZEY6].
122 Id.
12a Trade Reg. Rep. P 22341 (C.C.H.), 1986 WL 1353254.
124 See Amway's Story, supra note 95.
120 Id.
12s Global 100, DmECT SELLING NEWS, https://www.directselling news.com
/global-100·lists/ [https://perma.cc/PF4V-93QR].
127 See, e.g., Webster v. Omnitrition Int'l, Inc., 79 F.3d 776, 790 (9th Cir. 1996);
FTC v. Burnlounge, Inc., 753 F.3d 878, 889 (9th Cir. 2014).
128 See Omnitrition Int!, Inc., 79 F.3d at 780; Burnlou;nge, Inc., 753 F.3d at 889.
129 See Welcome to the Omnitrition Family, OMNITRITION INT'L, INc., https:/1
www .omnitrition.com/our·story/ [https://perma.cc/PXD5-4WTX].
121
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rules based on the Amway decision_130 Although the trial court
granted the company summary judgment, the Ninth Circuit reversed, determining that Omnitrition was set up as an illegal
pyramid scheme.1 31 In reversing the trial court's judgment, the
Ninth Circuit stated that, unlike Amway's rules about product
sales, the rules that Omnitrition had in place were much weaker
and there was no evidence that all the rules in place were actually enforced.132 For the appellate court, the major distinguishing
factor between Amway and Omnitrition was that Amway actually
seemed to encourage sales; the Court did not think the same was
true for Omnitrition_133
Following Omnitrition, the FTC released an advisory opinion
clarifying that any percentage of a company's internal consumption
of products-i.e., when distributors purchase the goods for their
own use and not to sell to consumers outside of the company-is
not determinative of if the company is a pyramid scheme.1 34 Instead, a company is an illegal pyramid scheme where the primary
means of distributor compensation relates to the enrollment and
recruitment of members to participate in the business. 135
In some circumstances, MLMs have attempted to disguise
these types of compensation structures through the forced sale of
products to new members.1 36 Burnlounge, an MLM that sold digital music, did just that.1 37 In 2014, the Ninth Circuit determined
that Burnlounge's compensation plan amounted to an illegal pyramid scheme.1 38 Burnlounge required their new distributors to
purchase a non-refundable package of music; ultimately "a participant's compensation was dependent on the aggregate payments
See Webster v. Omnitrition Int'l, Inc., 79 F.3d 776, 779--80 (9th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 790.
182 Id. at 784.
13a Id.
134 See Letter of James A. Kohm, Acting Dir. of Mktg. Practices at the U.S.
Fed. Trade Comm'n, to Neil H. Offen, President of the Direct Selling Ass'n
(Jan. 14, 2004), https://www.ftc.gov/systemlfiles/documents/advisory_opinions
/staff-advisory-opinion-pyramid·scheme·analysis/040114bizopp-pyramid.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A7MQ·QRFL].
135 See id.
186 See FTC v. Burnlounge, Inc., 753 F.3d 878, 881 (9th Cir. 2014).
137 Id. at 880.
188 See id. at 889.
180
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of new recruits to join the ... program."139 As the Court pointed out,
Amway's compensation structure was more heavily conditioned
on voluntary product sales, and Amway actively discouraged distributors from forcing large amounts of inventory onto new distributors.140 In a similar case, a district court issued an injunction
against Vemma Nutrition Co., an MLM that sells nutritional products.141 There, the company required a significant size of regular
purchases from its distributors in order to remain eligible for
further company purchases.142 Ultimately, the Court determined
that these required purchases, which would amount to $2,250 in
the distributors' first year, amounted to "inventory loading" and
issued an injunction against the company_143
Recent case law has shown that, in order to classify a company as an illegal pyramid scheme, courts must determine whether
the business is set up to encourage sales; the specific method of
encouragement is not as critical.1 44 Therefore, the retail rules outlined in the Amway decision are not requirements but rather guidance for other MLMs_145
Ultimately, it is clear that the Amway decision and its
progeny have not deterred many MLMs. Therefore, a different
approach is needed with increased regulations in order to better
protect distributors. However, promulgating new regulations
poses a different challenge: overcoming MLM's established political power.

B. Political Influence
Just five years following the 1979 Amway decision, President
Ronald Reagan spoke at an Amway sponsored event--on the day
after the 1984 State of the Union Address_146 Amway's executives, Jay Van Andel and Richard DeVos, were well-connected to
Sobieraj, supra note 27; see Burnlounge, 753 F.3d at 883.
See Burnlounge, 753 F.3d at 886.
141 See FTC v. Vemma Nutrition Co., 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 179855, at *4,
*36 (D. Ariz. Sept. 18, 2015).
142 See id. at *11-12.
143 See id.
144 See supra notes 127--43 and accompanying text.
145 See Sobieraj, supra note 27.
146 See Russakoff & Williams, supra note 85.
139
140
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the political environment.1 47 Van Andel was the former chairman
of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and DeVos was the former Chair
of the Republican National Committee.1 48 Additionally, they were
both some of President Reagan's top donors during the 1980 election.149 The two were eager to secure Reagan to speak at their
event in celebration of ''free enterprise."15o
Due to Amway's ongoing legal trouble, the Reagan administration paused at the idea of Reagan speaking at an Amway
event.151 After encouragement from the top donors, Amway and
the administration agreed to a rebranding of the event, inviting
outside speakers and guests for a "Spirit of America-Salute to
Free Enterprise rally."152 Amway still led the way in organizing
the event; their distributors gave away 7,000 tickets, and the company paid for everything_153 The company also taped Reagan's
speech-with the two company executives by his side-to later
give to their distributors to help motivate their sales.15 4
Other presidents have also promoted MLMs.1 55 In 2019,
President George W. Bush spoke at the annual People Helping
People Conference, an event organized by an insurance sales MLM
company.1 56 Prior to being elected, President Donald Trump was
substantially linked to two MLMs, making over $11 million from
promoting them.157 Also, President Trump was named in a 2018
class action lawsuit against an MLM, as he claimed that joining
was a "great opportunity" with a low risk.15B
Id.
Id.
149 Id.
150 Id.
161 Id. At the time, Amway had just been fined $20 million by Canada for not
paying import fees. Id.
152 Id.
163 Id.
154 Id.
166 See, e.g., Will Sommer & Kelly Weill, George W. Bush, Kobe Bryant,
Jordan Peterson Promote Shady Multilevel Marketing Company, DAILY BEAST
(May 30, 2019), https:/lwww.thedailybeast.com/george·w-bush-kobe-bryant-jordan
-peterson-promote-shady-multilevel-marketing-company-php-agency [https:/1
perma.cc/8T56-ZZAW].
166 See id.
167 See Voytko, supra note 86.
168 Id.
147
148
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But the influence ofMLMs is not restricted to just the highest office in the land_159 Rather, MLMs have been able to flourish
largely due to their lobbying work.1 60 Until recent years, little to
no money was spent on lobbying the critiques of the MLM business
model.1 61 However, political opportunities follow significant monetary donations.1 62 Betsy DeVos, the former Secretary of Education
under President Trump, married into the DeVos family that started
Amway_163 In 1997, DeVos stated that her family was the ''biggest
contributor of soft money to the Republican National Committee,"
and that as such, they "expect a return on [their] investment."164

Ill. THE NEED FOR INCREASED REGULATIONS
Like any free market economy, the United States' economy
thrives when consumers are knowledgeable about available products and services_165 The FTC's Consumer Protection Bureau works
to ensure that the marketplace is free from deceptive or misleading practices, as well as any other unfair business practices_166
However, these direct selling companies and their deceptive
business models have been invading many of the FTC's business
sectors in the last few decades_167

A. Income Disclosures
Although many MLMs voluntarily release income disclosure statements, these statements often give doctored ideas of the
See Stroud, supra note 84.
See id. (''MLM lives and has always lived on the strength of its lobbying.").
161 See id.
162 See Daniel Nyberg, Corporations, Politics, and Democracy: Corporate Political Activities as Political Corruption, 2 ORG. THEORY 1, 10 (2021).
163 See Chase Peterson-Withorn, Inside Betsy DeVos' Billions: Just How
Rich Is The Education Secretary?, FORBES (July 24, 2019), https://www.forbes
.com/sites/chasewithorn/2019/07/24/inside-betsy-devos-billions-just-how-rich-is
-the-education-secretary/#4b2423a43b0e [https://perma.cc/DK9M-CZ5X].
164 Jane Mayer, Betsy DeVos, Trump's Big-Donor Education Secretary, NEW
YORKER (Nov. 23, 2016), https:/lwww.newyorker.com/news/news-desklbetsy-devos
-trumps-big-donor-education-secretary [https://perma.cc/B468-PF6G].
166 See Valentine, supra note 36.
1ss See id.
167 See id.
169
160
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amount of money participants can make if they join,l6B MLMs
are not required by law to release information about their participants' income-the Consumer Protection Bureau exempted them
from making these disclosures in 2008. 169 But many MLMs still
create these forms, as they serve as an investment prospectus to
potential distributors.170 While most of these disclosures give
prospective sellers an inaccurate idea of what they can expect to
make, the companies are often not able to totally hide the ball; it
is possible to use the available information to shape a more accurate picture of income opportunities,l71 Oftentimes, the companies give enough information so that savvy statisticians can
dig deeper to gain a more honest understanding of the real business prospects of joining the companies,172
A study by TruthinAdvertising.org ("TINA'') concluded
that, of the 140 members companies of the Direct Sales Association, 137 of them engaged in misleading income representations,l73
Many of these misrepresentations occurred in companies' income
disclosure statements.174 Further, many of these misrepresentations fit the same pattern; companies frequently use the same
deceptive tactics.175
First, despite the business model relying on selling "direct[ly]" to the ultimate consumers, these companies do not maintain records on the ultimate sales; instead, the data they present
covers broad sales-including purchases made by distributors,l76
This leaves prospective distributors with a false sense of what
they could make, as these companies almost always require offsetting costs: joining fees, monthly membership costs, or even
quota-based purchases made by distributors not to sell to others,
See Multilevel Marketing: The Day Job that Doesn't Pay, TRUTHIN·
(Dec. 18, 2017) [hereinafter Multilevel Marketing: The Day
Job that Doesn't Pay], https://www.truthinadvertising.org/mlm·income·claims
-investigation/ [https://perma.cc/JXJ2. 7HC8].
169 FTC Business Opportunity Rule, 16 C.F.R. § 437 (2021).
170 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 22.
171 See id.
112 See id.
173 See Multilevel Marketing: The Doy Job that Doesn ~ Pay, supra note 168.
174 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 22.
175 See id.
176 See id.
168
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but instead to reach a certain level within the company_177 These
offsetting costs are often not included on these disclosure forms_178
Therefore, these "income" statements do not present themselves
as gross compensation numbers, as they leave out any costs that
distributors have to spend.179
Further, the income disclosure agreements do not usually
cover all of their distributors; instead, they often exclude the least
successful distributors, presenting only the most successful sellers
in the data.1 8 For example, Herbalife only presents data for "Sales
Leaders with a Downline," which excludes eighty-seven percent
of their distributors.18 1 Nu Skin, another skin care MLM, leaves out
ninety-five percent of their distributors in their presented data.1 82
On top of only revealing information about a doctored subsection of distributors, these disclosures often present mean income
data rather than median income data.183 Because of the disproportionate income disparity between top-level recruiters and lowlevel recruiters-who are even still among the more relatively
successful MLM participants-the use of mean income data creates a starkly misleading representation of the select group.l 84
For example, Herbalife's statement shows that their distributors
have a mean income of $5,456. 185 But a close examination of the
data would show that less than one percent of the distributors
bring in more than $5,000 a year_186 Put differently, ninety-nine
percent of distributors make less than the average that is advertised_187 While the mean income of this group is $5,456, a deeper
reading of the disclosure reveals that the median compensation
of this group is actually $0.188

°

See id.
See id.
See id.
1ao See id.
181 See id.
182 See id.
183 See id.
184 See id.
177
178
179

185 HERBALIFE, HERBAIJFE: STATEMENT OF AVERAGE GROSS COMPENSATION
PAlD BY HERBALIFE TO U.S. MEMBERS IN 2014 (2021), https://www.herbalife
.corn/ContentJen-US/pdflbusiness-opportunity/statement-of-average-gross-com
pensation-usen.pdf [https://perma.cc/C2PJ-NC2H].
1BB See Fitzpatrick, supra note 22.
187 See id.
188
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It is not unusual for compensation to be non-existent for
MLM distributors_IB9 Beachbody, an MLM that sells fitness videos
and dietary supplements, promises that becoming a distributor
"means the ability to help yourself and others live healthier, more
fulfilling lives with the opportunity to earn additional income." 190
But the fine print of their income disclosure statements shows
that fifty-seven percent of their "coaches" that were distributors
for the entire year earned $0 from both commissions and bonuses
in 2019.191
The DSA has acknowledged that a majority of distributors
for their member companies make less than $10,000 annually,
with the median income being about $200 per month.192 TINA
analyzed thirty-two income disclosure statements and their findings were even worse: eighty percent of distributors made less
than $100 per month_193
One argument made to exempt MLMs from making fully
transparent disclosures is that some of their distributors join
only to reap the discounts that are offered to the members; they
do not join to try to sell to others or make a profit.1 94 However,
there is no way for these companies to distinguish distributors that
join strictly for the membership discounts from those that join to
try to make a profit.195 All recruits sign the same contracts and
pay the same membership fees to join.196 All members are tied to
See id.
Become a Team Beachbody Coach, TEAM BEACHBODY, https://www.team
beachbody.com/shop/us/coach [https://perma.cc/N64D-WSG 7].
191 See TEAM BEACHBODY, STATEMENT OF INDEPENDENT COACH EABNINGS,
http://images.beachbody.com/coach·office/downloads/statement_of_independent
_coach_earnings.pdf [https://perma.cc/S633-399W]. Beachbody calls their distributors "coaches." Coach Sign Up, TEAM BEACHBODY, https:/lwww.teambeach
body.com/shop/us/coachlsignup [https://perma.cc/NKQ3-UMKD]. No fitness
degree or certification is required to be a coach; coaches are only required to
pay $39.95 to start and $15.95 per month. Id.
192 The Direct Selling Ass'n, Comments on the Notice of Proposed Rule·
making for the Business Opportunity Rule 15 (July 17, 2006), https://www.ftc
.gov/system/files/documentslpublic_comments/2006/07/522418-12055.pdf [https:/1
perma.cc/7FHN-J8UM].
193 See Multilevel Marketing: The Day Job that Doesn ~Pay, supra note 168.
194 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 22.
195 See id.
196 See id.
189
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the company in the same way, regardless of their motivations behind joining_197 However, companies like Herbalife redefine the
distributors that do not make sales or recruit other members as
"customers"-not "distributors"-in their income disclosures. 198
Further, Herbalife defines members who make only modest
amounts through sales or recruiting are defined as ''part-time"
distributors.1 99 But MLMs do not ask their distributors questions about their efforts to sell and recruit, and, therefore, they
cannot know if the distributors that are unable to make sales
are not trying to make sales, nor could they know if their "parttime" distributors are spending less than forty hours a week for
the company.2oo These assumptions that the companies make
about their distributors' intentions are likely inaccurate; a 2018
survey of MLMs showed that distributors make less than seventy
cents per hour.2o1 The intentions of their distributors are unknown,
but companies simply frame them as "customers" or "part-time"
workers based on their outcomes.2o2

N. A TRANSPARENT PROPOSAL
These companies can no longer compel innocent people into
joining and losing money through deception. Over twenty million
Americans participate in MLM organizations every year, and, of
distributors polled, nearly all of them have stated that they joined
to make money.2oa However, about three in four of these people
either lost money or made no money at all.204 Of the small group
that did make money, the majority made less than $5,000 in total. 205
At the very least, people must understand what they are
signing up for when they join these companies. Debra Valentine,
the former General Counsel for the FTC said that the U.S. economy thrives when consumers are knowledgeable.2os If the FTC
See id.
See id.
199 See id.
200 See id.
2o1 See Laryea, supra note 16.
2o2 See Fitzpatrick, supra note 22.
2oa See DeLiema et al., supra note 76.
204 Id.
205 ld.
2os Valentine, supra note 36.
197
198
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wants to ensure that consumers are knowledgeable, it must step
in and place more stringent requirements on MLMs.207
Because of the political power that MLMs hold, enacting this
type of change would not be easy.2os It is because of their political
power that more stringent requirements are not currently in place. 209
That does not, however, mean that change is not worth pursuing.
The FTC needs to require direct sales companies to present potential new distributors with accurate information about
the financial prospects of joining. Many companies are currently
presenting some information. 210 But in most instances, that presentation is incredibly misleading. 211 The FTC needs to require
these companies to convey accurate data.
First, the FTC should require the disclosure of average distributor income within the first year of work. Recruiters pitch these
companies as a lifeline out of financial hardship.212 But nearly
half of all participants lose money.213 Potential new distributors
need to fully understand what they are joining and their likelihood for success, otherwise many financially at-risk people can
be severely harmed.214
Second, the FTC should require the disclosure of the necessary costs of participating in the company. Many of these disclosures completely ignore the buy-in costs required to continue
to work for these companies. 215 There are joining fees, monthly
membership costs, and even product purchases necessary for advertising, sales, and recruitment. 216 To be fully informed about
the financial commitment of joining one of these companies,
these potential new members must be able to understand both
the costs and the realistic earnings potential that come with
such a commitment.217
See id.
See supra Section II.B.
209 See id.
21o See supra notes 167-72 and accompanying text.
211 See id.
212 See Taylor, supra note 14.
213 See DeLiema et al., supra note 76.
214 See supra Part III.
21• See Fitzpatrick, supra note 22.
21s See id.
217 See id.
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Lastly, while these companies would still be allowed to
advertise the earnings potential of longer-tenured product distributors, they should be required to disclose the median-not
mean-income of these different groups.21s As previously discussed, the difference between these two figures is significant because the top earners at these companies, such as their executives,
make exponentially more money than the average distributor.219
MLMs would certainly push back against these proposed
regulations. Joseph Mariano, the President of the Direct Selling
Association, has stated that people join these organizations not
for a job but rather as an "activity."220 He also stated that the reason
that these numbers need to be presented this way is because many
people join MLMs-not because they want to sell products-but
because they want to have access to the lower-price perks that
come with membership.221
Aside from studies showing that this intention only is
present with a small minority of distributors, 222 this issue would
be simple for these companies to address.22a Many businesses
offer preferred customer status, where they charge a monthly or
yearly fee in exchange for giving the customer special deals and
rates.224 MLMs can simply silo a new type of membership in
their company structure that does not offer the opportunity for
these members to sell products.225 This would allow the companies to still receive revenue from membership costs, but it would
allow them to more easily separate their active distributors from
their distributors that have only joined for the perks.226 Thus,
presenting accurate and realistic data would be much easier.
See DeLiema et al., supra note 76.
See supra notes 180-84 and accompanying text.
22o See The Dream, Sl Ell: And That's When I Woke Up, WITNESS Docs,
at 20:45 (2018) (downloaded using Apple Podcasts).
221 Id. at 15:20.
222 See DeLiema et al., supra note 76.
22a See id.
224 See, e.g., Membership, BARNES & NOBLE, https:/lwww.barnesandnoble.com
/membership/ [https://perma.cc/JCV6-F8BN]; Join Costco, COSTCO WHOLESALE,
https://www.costco.com/join-costco.html [https://perma.cc/E5KP-2EHJ].
225 See Heather Martin, Defining Distributors Versus Customers, DIRECT
SELLING NEWS (Oct. 1, 2017), https://www.directsellingnews.com/defining-dis
tributors-versus-customers/ [https://perma.cc/ZMJ6-MGJY] (demonstrating MLMs
beginning to silo consumers and distributors into more distinct categories).
226 See id.
21s
219
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CONCLUSION

Despite the three pillars of the Amway decision, many MLMs
still try and fmd ways to skirt the law.227 In doing so, their busi·
ness models more and more resemble illegal pyramid schemes or
Ponzi schemes.22s Consumers are being exploited.229 It is clear that
stricter guidance is necessary to protect them.2ao But these companies have historically been intertwined with politicalleaders.231
These expansive political ties have allowed these companies sig·
nificant regulatory slack but this has gone too far.232
Too many people join these companies and lose money.233
These companies thrive because of false promises of economic
prosperity-a promise that many economically at-risk individuals
buy into, leading to even more drastic financial misfortunes. 234
By enacting strict, transparent rules for these companies to dis·
close helpful information, new participants will be making better
informed financial decisions when they buy in. 235 If free market
economies thrive on knowledgeable decision-making,236 then enacting these requirements should be a no-brainer.
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229 See supra Section II.A.2.
2ao See supra Section II.A.2.
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